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11. Introduction.
The standard view that Bertrand competition is more efficient than Cournot
competition has recently been challenged by a number of theoretical models. A
common feature of these models is the idea that firms compete both in variables that
can be easily changed in the short run, such as price or output, and in variables that
constitute longer-term commitments, such as capacity or R&D expenditure. Much of
this literature has specifically focused on expenditure in process R&D as the long-run
decision variable. Product R&D, although empirically more important (see Scherer
and Ross 1990), has received little attention in these studies.
This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated
duopoly with substitute goods and product R&D. Vives (1985) and Singh and Vives
(1984) found that Bertrand competition results in higher consumer surplus, lower
profits and higher overall welfare than Cournot competition in a duopoly model where
goods are substitutes and the firms’ only choice variable is either price or output.
Motta (1993) found price competition to result in higher consumer surplus, profits and
overall welfare than quantity competition in the context of a vertically differentiated
duopoly with either fixed or variable costs of quality improvement. Although the case
of fixed costs of quality improvement can be naturally interpreted as product R&D,
the study by Motta did not allow for R&D spillovers. On the other hand, Delbono and
Denicolo (1990) found that the welfare comparison between Bertrand and Cournot is
generally ambiguous in the context of a homogeneous product duopoly with process
R&D in the form of a patent race, although R&D investment is higher in the Bertrand
equilibrium (in fact, it is even higher than the socially optimal level). Finally, Qiu
(1997), who used the Singh and Vives (1984) linear demand structure but introduced
a stage of process R&D competition prior to the price or quantity-setting stage, found
2that R&D expenditure is higher under Cournot than under Bertrand; that the opposite
is true for consumer surplus; that the Bertrand equilibrium is more efficient than the
Cournot equilibrium if either R&D productivity is low, or spillovers are weak, or
products are very differentiated; and that the Bertrand equilibrium is less efficient
than the Cournot equilibrium if R&D productivity is high, spillovers are strong, and
products are close substitutes.1
This paper addresses these issues in the context of a model with both
horizontal and vertical product differentiation, the latter of which is due to product
R&D. An important difference between process and product R&D is that the latter
directly affects gross consumer surplus. This is because product R&D raises product
quality, and quality enters directly into each consumer’s utility function. On the other
hand, process R&D affects gross consumer surplus only indirectly, through a
reduction in marginal cost and a consequent increase in output. Thus it is not clear
whether the results from models with process R&D carry over to the case of product
R&D. Moreover, the present model differs from models of ‘pure vertical
differentiation’, such as the one used by Motta (1993), in important ways, including
key properties of the firms’ profit functions, as will be explained in the next section. It
is therefore also an open question whether the existing results from the literature on
vertical product differentiation are robust to alternative ways of introducing quality
into the utility function.
                                                
1 Bester and Petrakis (1993), who also analysed a game of investment in process R&D
using a linear demand structure, obtained results different from those of Qiu (1997)
because in their model only one firm was allowed to invest in R&D.
3I analyse here a variant of the standard linear demand model. In particular, I
use the quality-augmented linear demand structure proposed by Sutton (1997, 1998),
and I also introduce a cost structure that allows for R&D spillovers. I also check the
robustness of my results to alternative demand systems and R&D cost functions. I
find that R&D expenditure, prices and firms’ net profits are always higher under
quantity competition than under price competition. Furthermore, output, consumer
surplus and total welfare are higher in the Bertrand equilibrium than in the Cournot
equilibrium if either R&D spillovers are weak or products are sufficiently
differentiated. If R&D spillovers are strong and products are not too differentiated,
then output, consumer surplus and total welfare are lower in the Bertrand case than in
the Cournot case.
Some of these results are consistent with those obtained by Qiu (1997) in the
context of a model with process R&D. There are also, however, important differences.
Under process R&D, consumer surplus is always higher under Bertrand competition,
just as in Singh and Vives (1984), but the overall efficiency comparison of the two
regimes is ambiguous, presumably because Cournot profits can be a lot higher than
Bertrand profits, thus causing the ambiguity. On the other hand, in the present model
of product R&D, the overall welfare comparison is also ambiguous, but for different
reasons. In particular, not only profits but also consumer surplus can be higher in the
Cournot equilibrium; this will occur if both R&D spillovers are strong and the goods
are not too differentiated. This is a new result and suggests that both consumers and
producers can be better off under quantity competition than under price competition.
42. The Model.
Consider a duopoly where each firm produces one variety of a differentiated product.
Firms invest in R&D in order to enhance product quality. More specifically,
competition in the industry is described by a two-stage game as follows. At stage 1
each firm chooses a variety, described by a vertical attribute u that I will call ‘quality’
and is associated with some physical product characteristic. Quality increases the
consumers’ willingness to pay for the firm’s variety, but it comes at a cost, namely
expenditure on product R&D. At stage 2 the firms set quantities or prices.
The structure of this game reflects the fact that (i) decisions on R&D
expenditure involve significant sunk costs and (ii) product characteristics cannot be
changed as easily or as quickly as price or quantity choices. However, I abstract from
issues of uncertainty regarding the outcome of R&D projects, as do many models
within the general class of ‘non-tournament’ models of R&D rivalry, of which the
present model is an example. The key underlying assumption of these models, as
opposed to the literature on patent races, is that each firm can achieve product or
process improvements through its R&D expenditure without preventing other firms
from obtaining equivalent benefits from their own R&D.
There are S identical consumers, and the utility function of each consumer
takes the form
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following Sutton (1997, 1998) (see also Symeonidis 1999, 2000). Note that (1) is a
quality-augmented version of the standard quadratic utility function used, among
others, by Singh and Vives (1984), Vives (1985), and Qiu (1997). Thus xi and ui are,
respectively, the quantity and quality of variety i and jjii xpxpYM −−=  denotes
5expenditure on outside goods. This utility function implies that each consumer spends
only a small part of her income on the industry’s product (which also ensures that the
maximisation of U has an interior solution) and hence income effects on the industry
under consideration can be ignored and partial equilibrium analysis can be applied.
The parameter σ, σ∈(0,2), is an (exogenous) inverse measure of the degree of
horizontal product differentiation: in the limit as σ → 0 the goods become
independent, while in the limit as σ → 2 they become perfect substitutes when ui = uj.
The inverse demand function of each consumer for variety i is given by
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in the region of quantity spaces where prices are positive. The demand function is
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in the region of prices where quantities are positive. It can be easily seen that xi is
decreasing in pi and increasing in ui. Also, it is increasing in pj and decreasing in uj.
An attractive feature of the present model – and one that distinguishes it from models
of ‘pure vertical differentiation’, which do not have this property – is that it gives rise
to reduced-form profit functions where (gross) profit increases in own quality and
decreases in rival quality (see below). Since there are S consumers, firm i sells
quantity Sxi. Let each firm have a constant marginal cost of production c, where c < 1.
Admittedly, the demand system used in this paper is rather specific. To check
the robustness of my results with respect to other specifications of demand, I analyse
in the appendix an alternative extension of the quadratic utility model, following
Häckner (2000). The results from this alternative demand system are very similar to
6those presented in the main body of the paper: all the propositions proved below are
robust to the choice of demand specification.
The function linking quality ui to R&D expenditures Ri and Rj is a modified
version of the one used by Motta (1992) and is given by ui = ,4/14/1 ji RR ερε +  where ε, ε
> 0, is an inverse measure of the cost of R&D or an index of technological
opportunity in the industry and ρ, ρ∈[0,1], captures the extent of technological
spillovers. Both these parameters are industry-specific and exogenously determined
by technology. Note that the above function implies that there are decreasing returns
to R&D. This assumption, which is very common in this class of models, is necessary
if the second-order condition for an interior maximum in the R&D stage is to be
satisfied.2 Apart from that assumption, the particular form of the R&D cost function is
not crucial: for instance, none of the results reported below changes if one uses the
function ui = 3/13/1 ji RR ερε +  instead, although the model becomes analytically more
complicated.
The use of the R&D cost function ui = 4/14/1 ji RR ερε +  to model R&D spillovers
is based on the commonly made assumption that the spillovers take place in R&D
                                                
2 As pointed out in Sutton (1998), the economics of this model depends only on the
composite mapping from firms’ fixed costs to firms’ gross profits, rather than on the
separate mappings of fixed costs to qualities and from qualities to gross profits. Thus
the results would not change if we replaced u by uγ, γ > 0, in the utility function and
modified the R&D cost function accordingly so that the second-order condition for an
interior maximum in the R&D stage were always satisfied. Under this more general
formulation, both gross profit and R&D cost could be either concave or convex in u,
although gross profit would still need to be concave in R&D cost.
7outcomes. An alternative approach is to regard spillovers as taking place in R&D
inputs or expenditures (see Amir 2000 for a comparison of the two approaches). To
check whether the results of the present paper are robust to the choice of approach to
modelling spillovers I also analysed a version of the model using the alternative R&D
cost function ui = 4/1)( ji RR ρε + .3 The results were very similar to those reported
below: none of the propositions proved in the paper are affected by the choice of
R&D cost function.
A symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium in pure strategies in the two-stage
game can be easily computed. In the next two sections this equilibrium is
characterised first for the quantity-setting (Cournot) case and then for the price-setting
(Bertrand) case.
3. Cournot Equilibrium.
When firms set quantities in the final-stage subgame, firm i chooses xi to maximise
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in the regions where prices and quantities are positive. In the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium we have
,,2,1,
)4()4(
)4()1(2
,
)4)(4(
)4()1(
22
22
iji
uucSuuuc
x jiCi
jiiC
i ≠=
+−
−−
=
+−
−−
=
σσ
σ
π
σσ
σ
 (4)
in the region of quality spaces where xi and xj are both positive, i.e. for ui/uj < 4/σ, i =
1,2, j ≠ i. Note that if this condition did not hold, then one of the two firms
(specifically, the low-quality one) would have zero sales and the other would make
                                                
3 I am indebted to a referee for suggesting this alternative R&D cost function.
8monopoly profit 8)1( 22 ucSM −=π . However, this case is not relevant as a potential
equilibrium of the game: for one thing, a firm would never choose a level of R&D
that resulted in zero output, since it would then be making negative net profit.
At stage 1 each firm chooses a quality level to maximise net profit R−π ,
given the choice of the other firm. The first-order condition for firm i is
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i.e. each firm spends on R&D up to the point where the cost of an extra unit of R&D
is equal to the profit it creates in the final stage of the game. Substituting the
expressions for the various partial derivatives in (5), setting ui = ,4/14/1 ji RR ερε +  and
solving for the (symmetric) equilibrium, we obtain
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The second-order condition for an interior maximum at the symmetric equilibrium is
given by 022 <∂∂ iCi Rπ  when evaluated at ui = uj = uC. After some straightforward
manipulations this gives
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which is always true.
To compute the equilibrium price and quantity we set ui = uj = uC in (4). We
obtain:
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9Finally, equilibrium consumer surplus, firms’ profits (net of R&D costs) and total
welfare are, respectively, given as
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4. Bertrand Equilibrium.
When firms set prices in the final-stage subgame, firm i chooses pi to maximise
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in the regions where prices and quantities are positive. In the Bertrand-Nash
equilibrium we have
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in the region of quality spaces where xi and xj are both positive, i.e. for ui/uj <
σσ 2/)8( 2− , i = 1,2, j ≠ i. If this condition did not hold, then one of the firms would
have zero sales and the other would make monopoly profit. However, such quality
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configurations can be ruled out (see the discussion in the previous section), so the
above condition is always met in the two-stage game.
At stage 1 each firm chooses a quality level to maximise net profit R−π ,
given the choice of the other firm. The first-order condition for firm i is
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Substituting the expressions for the various partial derivatives in (12), setting ui
= ,4/14/1 ji RR ερε +  and solving for the (symmetric) equilibrium, we obtain
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The second-order condition for an interior maximum at the symmetric equilibrium is
given by 022 <∂∂ iBi Rπ  when evaluated at ui = uj = uB. This simplifies to
[ ]
.0
)2)(2()4()4(4
)3424()38(2)28()1(
22
2/322222
<
+−+−
−−+−−−−−− −
σσσσ
σσρσσρσσε BRcS
This condition is satisfied provided 0)3424()38(2 22 >−−+−− σσρσσ , which I
assume in what follows.4
The equilibrium price and quantity are derived by setting ui = uj = uB in (11).
We obtain:
                                                
4 It is easy to check that the second-order condition always holds if 0 < σ <
2/)413( +− . If 2/)413( +−  ≤ σ < 2, then for any particular value of σ, say σ0,
there is a corresponding value of ρ∈[0,1), say ρ0, such that the second-order condition
holds for all ρ > ρ0. As σ0 increases, so does ρ0.
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The expressions for consumer surplus CSB, firms’ profits (net of R&D costs) ΠB and
total welfare WB are similar to those under Cournot behaviour, with pB, xB and uB in
place of pC, xC and uC.
5. Comparison.
I begin by comparing the R&D incentives, prices and output levels under the two
regimes. From (6) and (13) we obtain:
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This also implies that uC > uB. Hence:
Proposition 1. Quality, and hence also R&D expenditure, is higher under quantity
competition than under price competition.
As quality increases the consumers’ willingness to pay, and it is higher under
Cournot than under Bertrand, it is not surprising that the ranking of equilibrium price
levels in the present model is not different from the one obtained from a model
without quality. In particular, (7) and (14) imply
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Thus:
Proposition 2. Price is higher under Cournot than under Bertrand.
12
Unlike price, there is no clear ranking of the two regimes with respect to
quantity produced. It is easy to check that, for any given quality, Bertrand firms
produce more output than Cournot firms. However, since quality is higher under
quantity competition than under price competition and high quality boosts demand,
the overall ranking is ambiguous. More specifically:
Proposition 3. Output is higher in the Bertrand equilibrium than in the Cournot
equilibrium if either R&D spillovers are weak or the goods are sufficiently
differentiated. It is lower in the Bertrand equilibrium than in the Cournot equilibrium
if R&D spillovers are strong and the goods are not too differentiated.
Proof. From equations (6), (7), (13) and (14) we obtain
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The sign of this expression is the same as the sign of the term in brackets. Let G
denote that term; it can be positive or negative depending on the values of σ and ρ
within the range of pairs (σ,ρ) such that the second-order condition in the Bertrand
case is satisfied and ΠB > 0 (see below). It is easy to check that G(ρ = 0,σ = 0) = 32 >
0, G(ρ = 0,σ = 2) = 8 > 0, and G(ρ = 1,σ = 0) = 32 > 0. By continuity, whenever
either ρ is close or equal to 0 or σ is close to 0 (or both), we have G > 0, and hence xB
> xC. Moreover, ∂G/∂ρ = )416( 2σσσ −+−  < 0 and ∂G/∂σ = )3816(12 2σσρσ −+−−
< 0 for all ρ∈[0,1], σ∈(0,2); that is, G decreases in both ρ and σ. To complete the
proof we only need to show that xB – xC becomes negative for sufficiently large values
13
of both ρ and σ. This is straightforward to check; for instance, G(ρ = 0.8,σ = 1.8) =
−16.1824 < 0.
This result is different from the one found by Qiu (1997) in the context of a
model with process R&D; in that case, quantity sold was always higher under
Bertrand than under Cournot. The reason for the difference is that, while process
R&D reduces marginal cost, product R&D boosts demand. Both in the model by Qiu
and in the present model Cournot firms spend more on R&D than Bertrand firms. In
the model by Qiu the direct effect of this is to lower the marginal cost of Cournot
firms more than that of Bertrand firms; the main effect is therefore on profits rather
than on sales. In the present model the direct effect of more R&D by Cournot firms is
that these firms experience a boost in sales stronger than the one experienced by
Bertrand firms. Under certain circumstances, in particular if R&D spillovers are
strong and goods are not too differentiated, this can lead to equilibrium output being
higher under quantity than under price competition.
An implication of the above is that the ranking of the two regimes with respect
to consumer surplus is also ambiguous:
Proposition 4. Consumer surplus is higher in the Bertrand equilibrium than in the
Cournot equilibrium if either R&D spillovers are weak or the goods are sufficiently
differentiated. It is lower in the Bertrand equilibrium than in the Cournot equilibrium
if R&D spillovers are strong and the goods are not too differentiated.
Proof. Consumer surplus in the Cournot equilibrium is computed easily using
equations (6), (7) and (8):
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Similarly, in the Bertrand equilibrium we have
.
)4()4()2(
)1)(28()1(4
42
32442
σσσ
ρσρσε
+−+
+−−−
=
cSCSB  (19)
Hence
,
)4()4()2(
)1()1(
442
32442
σσσ
ρσε
+−+
+−
=−
HcSCSCS CB  (20)
where
).61296192()72448128(4 432432 σσσσρσσσσσ +−−+−+−−+=H
The sign of CB CSCS −  is the same as the sign of H: it can be positive or negative
depending on the values of σ and ρ within the range of pairs (σ,ρ) such that the
second-order condition in the Bertrand case is satisfied and ΠB > 0 (see below). We
have H(ρ = 0,σ = 0) = 512 > 0, H(ρ = 0,σ = 2) = 352 > 0, and H(ρ = 1,σ = 0) = 512 >
0. By continuity, whenever either ρ is close or equal to 0 or σ is close to 0 (or both),
we have H > 0 and BCS  > CCS . Also, ∂H/∂ρ = )61296192( 432 σσσσσ +−−+−  <
0 for all ρ∈[0,1], σ∈(0,2); that is, H decreases in ρ. On the other hand, ∂H/∂σ =
)52436192192()4214848(4 43232 σσσσρσσσ +−−+−+−− , which can be positive
or negative. But since ∂ 2H/∂σ 2 = )51848(4)37(24)4(48 322 σσρρσσσ +−−−−−−
< 0 for all ρ∈[0,1], σ∈(0,2), we can conclude that H first increases and then decreases
in σ. To complete the proof, then, we only need to show that CB CSCS −  becomes
negative whenever ρ and σ are both sufficiently large. This is indeed the case; for
instance, H(ρ = 0.8,σ = 1.8) = −8.79846 < 0.
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Next, we compare total net profits under the two regimes. The result is not
immediately obvious, since both gross industry profit and R&D cost are higher in the
Cournot equilibrium. Under quantity competition, we get from (6), (7) and (9)
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Similarly, under price competition we obtain
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which I assume to be positive.5 It follows that:
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which is positive for all ρ∈[0,1], σ∈(0,2). Hence:
Proposition 5. Profits net of R&D costs are higher under quantity competition than
under price competition.
As pointed out in the Introduction, Motta (1993), who also examined a model
of vertical product differentiation with fixed costs of quality improvement, found that
profits are always higher in the Bertrand rather than the Cournot equilibrium, which is
                                                
5 This is always the case if 0 < σ < 2/)31( +− . If 2/)31( +−  ≤ σ < 2, then for any
particular value of σ, say σ1, there is a corresponding value of ρ∈[0,1), say ρ1, such
that ΠB > 0 for all ρ > ρ1. As σ1 rises, so does ρ1.
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the opposite of my result. However, Motta used a model that allows for quality
differences between firms. In that context, firms differentiate their products (i.e.
increase their quality difference), and hence ‘relax’ competition in the final-stage
subgame, more under the price-setting regime than under the quantity-setting regime.
This effect is absent from the present model, which focuses on symmetric equilibria.
Finally, we show that the overall efficiency ranking of the two regimes is
ambiguous, a result which is largely a consequence of Proposition 4:
Proposition 6. Total welfare is higher in the Bertrand equilibrium than in the Cournot
equilibrium if either R&D spillovers are weak or the goods are sufficiently
differentiated. It is lower in the Bertrand equilibrium than in the Cournot equilibrium
if R&D spillovers are strong and the goods are not too differentiated.
Proof. In the Cournot equilibrium, welfare is given by substituting equations (6) and
(7) into (10):
[ ].
)4()4(
)24(216)1)(4()1(
42
222442
σσ
σρσσρρσε
+−
−+−−+−−
=
cSWC  (24)
For the Bertrand equilibrium we get:
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The sign of WB – WC is the same as the sign of J: it can be positive or negative
depending on the values of σ and ρ within the range of pairs (σ,ρ) such that the
second-order condition in the Bertrand case is satisfied and ΠB > 0. Now J(ρ = 0,σ =
0) = 512 > 0, J(ρ = 0,σ = 2) = 32 > 0, and J(ρ = 1,σ = 0) = 512 > 0. By continuity,
when either ρ is close or equal to 0 or σ is close to 0 (or both), we have J > 0, and
hence WB – WC > 0. Moreover, ∂J/∂ρ = )44464320( 432 σσσσσ +−−+−  < 0 and
∂J/∂σ = [ ])52640)(2(246016()4( 22 σσσρσσσ −+−+−++−  < 0 for all ρ∈[0,1],
σ∈(0,2); that is, J decreases in both ρ and σ. To complete the proof we need to show
that WB – WC < 0 when both ρ and σ are sufficiently large. This is straightforward to
check; for instance, J(ρ = 0.8,σ = 1.8) = −287.876 < 0.
Why does the ranking of the two equilibria with respect to consumer surplus
and welfare depend on the extent of R&D spillovers and the degree of horizontal
product differentiation? Recall that in the present model it is the dynamic efficiency
of Cournot competition versus the static efficiency of Bertrand competition that
causes the ambiguity in the overall comparison of consumer surplus and welfare in
the two regimes. It is therefore not surprising that the larger the difference uC – uB, the
more likely it is that the dynamic efficiency of Cournot competition dominates the
static efficiency of Bertrand competition. Now it can be checked that ∂(uC – uB)/∂ρ >
0 and ∂(uC – uB)/∂σ > 0.6 In other words, not only is R&D expenditure higher in the
Cournot equilibrium than in the Bertrand equilibrium, but the difference between the
                                                
6 This is true independent of the particular form of the R&D cost function, i.e. it is
true also when using the function ui = 4/1)( ji RR ρε + .
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two increases as R&D spillovers become stronger or goods become less
differentiated. It follows that the larger the extent of spillovers and the less
differentiated the products, the more likely it is that the dynamic efficiency of Cournot
competition dominates the static efficiency of Bertrand competition.
6. Concluding Remarks.
The objective of this paper has been to fill a gap in the literature on the relative
efficiency of quantity and price competition under product differentiation. Using a
model where firms choose a level of expenditure on product R&D prior to setting
prices or quantities, I have shown that the Cournot equilibrium can be more or less
efficient than the Bertrand equilibrium depending on the extent of R&D spillovers and
the degree of product differentiation. The reason for the ambiguity is that firms spend
more on R&D when they set quantities rather than prices. These results are consistent
with those previously derived by Qiu (1997) for the case of process R&D. A major
new finding of the present paper is that, in an industry with product R&D, there are
circumstances where both consumer surplus and firms’ profits are higher in the
Cournot equilibrium than in the Bertrand equilibrium.
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APPENDIX
I analyse here an alternative version of the quality-augmented quadratic utility model,
following Häckner (2000). The structure of the game is the same as before. There are
S identical consumers, and the utility function of each consumer takes the form
MxxxxxuxuU jijijjii +−−−+= σ
22 , (A1)
where the notation is the same as in section 2. The inverse demand function of each
consumer for variety i is given by
,,2,1,,2 jijixxup jiii ≠=−−= σ (A2)
in the region of quantity spaces where prices are positive. The demand function is
,,2,1,,
)2)(2(
)()(2
jiji
pupu
x jjiii ≠=+−
−−−
=
σσ
σ
(A3)
in the region of prices where quantities are positive. Note that this demand function is
separable in pi, ui, pj and uj – unlike the demand function used in the main body of the
paper. Since there are S consumers, firm i sells quantity Sxi. The R&D cost function is
given by ui = ,4/14/1 ji RR ερε +  where ε and ρ are as defined in section 2.
In the quantity-setting case, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the final-stage
subgame involves
[ ]
,,2,1,
)4()4(
)4(42
,
)4)(4(
)4(4
22
2
iji
cuuScuu
x jiCi
jiC
i ≠=
+−
−−−
=
+−
−−−
=
σσ
σσ
π
σσ
σσ
 (A4)
in the region of quality spaces where xi and xj are both positive. To obtain
analytical solutions for the two-stage game, we need to set the marginal cost c = 0.
At the (symmetric) equilibrium of the two-stage game,
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(the second-order condition is always satisfied for c = 0). We also obtain
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In the price-setting case, the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium of the final-stage
subgame involves
[ ]
,,2,1,
)4()4)(2)(2(
)28(2)8(2
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22
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 (A10)
in the region of quality spaces where xi and xj are both positive. To obtain
analytical solutions for the two-stage game, we need again to set c = 0. At the
(symmetric) equilibrium of the two-stage game,
2/12/1
2/32/1222/1
4/1
)4()2)(4(
)1()28(
)1(
σσσ
ρσρσε
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S
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(the second-order condition is always satisfied for c = 0). We also obtain
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Comparing the two equilibria is straightforward. From (A6), (A5), (A12) and
(A11) we obtain
,
)4()4)(2(
)1(
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σσσ
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+
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where
.0)2(2)36)(2(16)1(64)880)(4( 22322 >++−+−+−+−−−= σρσρσσσρσσσσK
Hence pC > pB, as in proposition 2. Next, from (A6), (A5), (A12) and (A11) we
obtain
,
)4()4()2(
)1(
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σσσ
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−++
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where H is defined in the proof of proposition 4. Using a similar argument as the one
used for proving proposition 4, we can show that xB > xC unless both ρ and σ are
sufficiently large, in which case xB < xC – as in proposition 3. Finally, note that the
expressions for equilibrium quality, consumer surplus, net profit and total welfare
22
under both Cournot and Bertrand are identical to those obtained in the main body
of the text (for c = 0). It follows that propositions 1, 4, 5 and 6 are also robust to
the choice of demand specification.
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